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Abstract 
The purpose of this research is to assess what benefit a Mixed Waste Processing 
Facility (MWPF) could have in Columbus, Ohio; either replacing, or in addition to, the 
current single stream program. MWPFs may have the potential for higher rates of 
recovering recyclable materials, but it is significantly more costly than a single stream 
recycling facility. Columbus has a single stream recycling facility that captures recyclable 
materials segregated by residents, but the amount of recyclable material diverted from a 
landfill could be higher if the “participation rate” in theory rises to 100 percent if garbage 
is sorted at a MWPF. If the city of Columbus switches to a MWPF, then this may 
increase the total amount of recovered materials, reducing the cost associated with 
expanding landfills. However, it is not clear whether the benefit of increasing the amount 
of recycled material (thereby reducing the need to expand the landfill) justifies the cost of 
doing so, or if it is even possible through this method. This report includes an analysis of 
various recyclable materials and what facilities should focus on to be economical. With 
the current landscape, the best option for the city of Columbus is to have a single stream 
system combined with a mixed waste system, but the mixed waste process must focus 
primarily on organic materials for composting.        
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Single stream and mixed stream recycling have different rates of recovering 
recyclable materials. Single stream programs recover over 95 percent of what comes into 
their facility, but that is 95 percent of the participation rate (ex. 50% of people recycle * 
95% recovery = 47.5% recovered). According to a report by the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the national average recovery amount is 34.6 percent. Mixed stream 
recycling has the potential to capture recyclable materials at a higher rate, but the quality 
of the recovered materials is a concern. The key difference between a single stream and a 
mixed waste processing facility is where the recyclable materials are separated from the 
rest of the waste. In a single stream facility, residents are responsible for segregating 
recyclable materials from garbage that will go into a landfill. In contrast, recyclable 
material is separated from waste at a mixed waste processing facility (MWPF), 
eliminating the need for residents to separate them. However, MWPF is more expensive 
than a single stream facility, and have been shown to lead to higher consumption habits. 
Is the mixed stream approach better than single stream recycling? 
The focus of this project is to explore the most beneficial recycling process for the 
city of Columbus, whether that be supplementing current efforts or starting from scratch. 
I decided to focus on Columbus because over 75 percent of the population in Central 
Ohio live in the city limits. The main factors that can influence the effectiveness of 
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recycling systems are the state of the current technology, the level of consumer 
participation, the waste stream profile in the area, the willingness of the municipality to 
pay for recycling services, the age and condition of existing waste management 
infrastructure, the demand for recycled materials, and the cost of disposal (Flower, 2015). 
Due to some of these factors being highly variable by region there may not be a one-size-
fits-all approach. For example, since Central Ohio already has a decent recycling program 
in place, my recommendation to them could be different than my recommendation for a 
city starting from scratch like Houston, that only has a 6 percent recycling rate (Quinn, 
2016). 
This research draws from the knowledge and insights from the top manufacturers 
in the industry, two industry specific consulting firms, and the experience of various 
successful and failed facilities across the country. The report summarizes estimated costs 
and benefits of mixed waste facilities from Machinex, Bulk Handling Systems (BHS), 
Van Dyk Recycling Solutions (VDRS), Stadler, CP Group, Gershman Brickner and 
Bratton Inc. (GBB), and Resource Recycling Systems (RRS). I also describe the failed 
agreement that Central Ohio had back in 2014 with a company called Team Gemini to 
build a Sustainable Business Park next to the landfill and the recent failed MWPF in 
Alabama. 
I conducted analysis of various end products to know what the focus of a 
successful facility should be. Then I give cost estimations and recommendation for what 
Columbus could and should do moving forward. I find that investing in a MWPF that can 
recover all types of recyclable materials (metal, paper, glass, etc.) is not recommended 
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due to the contamination causing low recovery. I do find that it is more feasible to invest 
in an MWPF for separating organic waste only (i.e., compostable materials). This is more 
economical because it is a larger portion of the stream keeping more landfill space open, 
there is no concern about contamination, and it still allows for the future hope of getting 
those other materials out on the back end.  
It is also prudent to point out that current practices in some cities in California 
may not be viable in Ohio. One reason for this is that the potential political barriers to 
pass laws that will require residents to separate their trash into three separate bins may be 
difficult to overcome. My proposal will not require any changes in the law but will be an 
improvement over current practices and allow for that transition in the future with no 
capital waste. The next section is a brief overview of the evolution of the recycling 
processes and technologies in the past four decades. 
4 
 
Chapter 2. Overview of the Recycling Industry 
 Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) is garbage that goes to a landfill. The total amount 
of recovered recyclable materials have been increasing over the past few decades, while 
landfilled material has remained relatively steady since the late 1970’s as shown in 
Figure 1 below (Gershman, 2015, p. 5). Figure 1 shows that the total amount of recycled 
materials remained roughly the same from 2005-2010. Yet, there are many opportunities 
to increase the rate of recovery for recyclable materials and to decrease the total amount 
of landfill waste. 
 
Figure 1: MSW Production and Management: 1960-2012 
 Material Recovery Facilities (MRFs) have been used since the 1970’s, and this is 
where most recyclable materials are recovered. There are three popular types of MRFs: 
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(1) source separated, where everyone separates their own trash and puts it in separate bins 
or drop-off centers, (2) single stream system, where all recyclables are put in one bin and 
are taken to a machine that separates them further, (3) MWPF, originally called a dirty 
MRF because of the contamination, where a machine sorts through the entire dumpster to 
sort out the valuable materials so there is no separation at all required at the individual 
level. Single stream has made source separated obsolete because it is cleaner and more 
efficient. The purpose of this paper is to compare whether the higher cost associated with 
the MWPF justifies its potential benefits of increased recovery rates compared to the 
single stream system. 
There are also different end products these facilities create. Some sort out the 
valuable raw materials for resale, some only create energy and are usually referred to as 
Waste to Energy (WTE) facilities, and others do both. Among WTE there are many 
different technologies with the most popular being mass burn, where everything is 
burned, resource derived fuel (RDF), which is usually a product of plastics, and 
Anaerobic Digestion (AD) that can be done for the organic portion of the waste stream. 
These are important to note because single stream and mixed waste can both do these, but 
it can skew the facts. For example, some mass burn facilities tout 100 percent recovery 
rates, like the entire country of Sweden, because it isn’t sent to the landfill, but that is not 
true recovery. Creating energy from waste is much less sustainable then utilizing it for 
the raw material it is, which will be delved into more later.
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Chapter 3. The Current State of Recycling in Columbus 
 Columbus has had a strong focus on recycling. Columbus currently has a single 
stream system managed by Rumpke. The average recycling rate is at about 42 percent, 
well above the national average of 34.6. The main landfill in the area is managed by the 
Solid Waste Authority of Central Ohio (SWACO). SWACO and the city of Columbus 
have tried to supplement their single stream efforts and decrease the amount of material 
being landfilled. 
 Back in 2013/2014 SWACO had a deal that failed with a company named Team 
Gemini. This deal was intended to help minimize the amount of trash landfilled. Team 
Gemini was going to create a sustainable business park that would bring in companies to 
sort and use the material before it was landfilled. The main reason given for this deal 
falling through was the inability of Team Gemini to find sufficient funding. This facility 
would not have affected Rumpke because it would have acted as a last resort sort. The 
material that it would receive would be from garbage bins that Rumpke does not take to 
its recycling facility. I feel that it is important to analyze this deal to know what would 
need to be changed for it to have been successful.  
 To start let’s look at what one of the best consultants in the industry, GBB, says 
about Recovery Parks (also known as: Sustainable Business Parks or EcoParks). These 
parks create what is known as an Industrial Ecosystem or Industrial Symbiosis and are 
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companies that are within close proximity to each other and collaborate to use the by-
products from the other as inputs or shared resources whenever possible (Scozzafava, 
2015). This is a very sustainable process but trying to do it all at once may be too capital 
intensive.  
 However, this symbiosis is a great long-term goal, especially in today’s climate 
with the new National Sword regulations from China that have banned some of our 
recyclables and heightened the contamination requirements on others. These regulations 
have led to companies avoiding sending recyclables over due to getting rejected at 
customs and has flooded the local markets, driving prices down, and opening great 
opportunity for businesses to utilize them (Staub, 2018). Team Geminis plan would have 
been good at hedging against these new events. 
The deal between Team Gemini and SWACO was complex and far from ideal. 
The mixed waste processing facility was to consist of a landfill receiving facility (LRF) 
and a Center for Resource Recovery and Recycling (COR3). The LRF was to be owned 
and operated by SWACO and the COR3 by Team Gemini with the buildings having a 
combined area of more than 185,000 square feet (Team Gemini, 2016). The receiving 
facility, that SWACO would own and operate was expected to cost roughly $18 million 
and be fully paid for by Team Gemini (Jarman, 2013). It appears the facility was planned 
to process 2,000 tons per day and eventually double to handle the entire waste stream in 
the future with only 1,000 of the 4,000 tons initially expected to be recovered. The annual 
rent payment for the 350 leased acres was $350,000 with a 99-year lease and the facility 
was projected to cost $100 million for the initial 25 percent recovery, rising to a potential 
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$300 million of private money and creating about 300 permanent jobs for 100 percent 
recovery (Jarman, 2013) (Team Gemini, 2016). Problems seem inevitable with each 
entity having a facility they are responsible for and the large upfront capital required to 
meet intended scale. 
SWACO was excited about the potential of this project. According to Ron Mills 
the Executive Director of SWACO, the facility would recover metals and plastics, use 
organics for anaerobic digestion and have other sustainable energy generation 
technologies (Team Gemini, 2016). Garbage trucks would have taken trash there to 
separate recyclables that Team Gemini would have then sold. The residual material 
would then be taken to the landfill where they would pay a fee to dump the remainder 
(according to SWACO the Franklin County Sanitary Landfill charges $39.75 a ton in 
2018 and in 2016 it was an even higher $42.75). According to the president of Team 
Gemini,  
They intended to operate 35 acres of state-of-the-art greenhouses on the property 
to grow organic crops to sell. The goal is to be completely self-contained, he said, 
so that all the energy used by the companies in the park, as well as the businesses’ 
heating, cooling, water and waste-water needs, can be met onsite (Jarman, 2013, 
p. 17).   
 
Team Gemini was planning on selling a lot of the recovered material to companies that 
would hopefully come in and set up shop next to the MWPF. SWACO and Team Gemini 
were on the same page and both excited, but this seems to have been merely a pipedream. 
Team Gemini and SWACO made the following errors. They greatly 
underestimated the costs which rose to around $400 million (Ball, 2017). They also 
wanted to create space for other companies to come in at the beginning without having a 
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plan in place for selling the materials to other parties until that happened. It is respectable 
that they wanted to create the best facility they could, but they needed to focus more on 
realistic cost estimates and having startup plans in place to offload material until 
companies came to set up shop. Finally, SWACO should have had a stronger focus on 
ensuring a mutually beneficial relationship because the graduated scale of costs for 
tonnages returned to SWACO seemed unmanageable. Recycling is no longer a profitable 
business (which will be covered in more detail in Chapter 5) and these types of 
relationships need to be set up for mutual success and assistance in times of hardship. 
A big concern after a deal like this falling through and leaving SWACO with bills 
that were not fulfilled is that they are not immediately looking to find another solution to 
extending the life of their landfill. However, according to the director of SWACO, Ty 
Marsh, they are still very interested in pursuing waste minimizing deals. This is what Mr. 
Marsh said on the matter, “The failure of the Team Gemini project in no way diminishes 
our interest in leveraging the waste that’s generated in Franklin County for greater 
economic opportunity” (Rouan, 2016, p. 18). It is respectable and beneficial to the 
community that the authority still has sustainability as its number one priority.
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Chapter 4. Learning from a failed recycling facility in Montgomery, Alabama 
 IREP is the most recent example of a MWPF failing, but instead of letting people 
use it to write MWPFs off as not viable it is crucial to figure out exactly what the 
problems were. IREP broke ground on July 13, 2013, opened on April 14, 2014, and shut 
down in October of 2015. IREP was a 30-tph, facility that signed a deal to receive a 
minimum of 100,000 tons per year from Montgomery, Alabama. There was minimal to 
no recycling efforts in Montgomery so IREP would receive a stream much higher in 
plastic, metals, and fibers then what would be expected from Columbus dumpsters. IREP 
seems to have been far too optimistic in its expectations for this endeavor. 
The first problem was the expected recovery rates. The landfill divergence levels 
that IREP said they could achieve vary depending on the source, some have reported 75-
85 percent (Yawn, 2015), others have reported 60 percent with waste-to-energy and 
composting additions getting it to 90 percent (Montgomery, 2016). When looking at the 
forms IREP submitted with their $28 per ton bid the recovery rates were estimated at 80 
percent or better for mixed paper, 90 percent or better for OCC, tin, steel, and aluminum 
cans, and 85 percent or better for plastics. Kyle Mowitz, the CEO, claimed at a 
conference in November of 2014 that the numbers were 95 percent for mixed paper, 97 
percent for OCC, 94 percent for tin and steel cans, 90 percent for aluminum cans, and 96 
percent for plastics currently; while having no rejected loads, running 32.36 tph, and 
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having an overall diversion rate of 60 percent as of May (Smith, 2014). It is already odd 
that the estimations varied so much, but these are also unrealistic expectations if 
referencing what has been achieved in the past. 
The next problem arose from the combination of those over optimistic 
expectations with over optimistic values, and over estimating total tonnages. IREP 
estimated revenue of $9.2 million on 125,000 TPY of MSW using the output values in 
table 1. These were huge mistakes because they were only guaranteed 100,00 tons and 
these were current market values instead of taking a long run average approach and 
making a safe low-end estimate which is standard for a facility with an expected life of 
20+ years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: FOB Montgomery Pricing 
According to Van Dyke Recycling Solutions (VDRS), a MRF manufacturer that 
competes with Bulk Handling Solutions (BHS) that IREP used, revenue should have been 
estimated at $4.9 million at the time, which used lower output values and 100,000 tons 
per year to calculate. On top of this the facility was estimated at just over $23.1 million 
and ended up being in the ballpark of $32 million when the municipality took it back 
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over. Since they used their expected revenue of $9.2 million to calculate their offer of 
$28/ton to the city, it is obvious they were way over leveraged from day one. They should 
have bid much higher due to them overestimating recovery rates, overestimating output 
prices, underestimating facility cost, and some say overestimating ability to sell dirty 
goods.  
MWPF’s can have a hard time having a clean output of fibers and many have 
claimed that their overestimation of ability to sell this paper is what sunk IREP. Fran 
McPoland with the Paper Recycling Coalition said that “some corrugated paper was 
being bought from IREP, but with the market at a low, clean, quality paper is at a 
premium. Many weren't buying what IREP was selling (Yawn, 2015, p. 24).” Reports to 
bondholders indicated that the revenue from the sale of OCC, mixed/soiled fiber, PET, 
HDPE, mixed 3-7 plastics, aluminum cans and ferrous metals were over $1.9 million for 
the 8.5 months of operation in 2014 and can be seen broken down in table 2 (Paben, 
2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Recyclable Products/Marketing - FOB Montgomery Pricing 
This would appear to say that they weren’t having a problem with contamination. 
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IREPs failure was devastating to Montgomery’s financials. According to Crabb, 
Montgomery raised the garbage collection fees for the 70,000 households in the city to 
generate more than $2 million each year to put towards the facility (Paben, 2016). The 
deal had IREP being paid $2.8 million ($28/ton and 100,000 tons) a year for taking that 
amount of trash, but they had to repay the municipality on a graduated scale for every ton 
they sent to the landfill. After one year of operation, IREP owed the county $2.5 million 
for all the waste they sent to the landfill, according to Crabb. Crabb also said the city 
didn't make them pay it, "We actually forgave an excess of $2.5 million of garbage they 
were sending back to the landfill, because that percentage got to be so significant (Yawn, 
2015, p. 32).” At the end of it all, IREP earned a mere 10 percent of its projected profit 
while also being treated to more than $3 million in concessions. This graduated scale will 
help calculate estimates of the true recovery rates of the facility. 
 It will also be helpful to analyze operating statements. According to publicly 
available documents shown in table 3, IREP incurred an operating loss of $5.1 million on 
$3.9 million in revenue in 2014 (IREP, 2014). If you include interest expenses, the net 
losses rise to $6.4 million. Mowitz claimed that the volume received from the city was 
sometimes as much as 40 percent lower than the promised amounts (120,000 
*.6=72,000). However, the feedstock supply agreement was written so IREP couldn’t 
declare a city default on low volumes until after a year had passed (Paben, 2016). IREP 
left 18,210 tons of organic waste at the facility that would have earned the city more than 
$600,000 in tipping fees if the company had taken it to the landfill. In the final year of 
operation, the facility received 78,000 tons of trash from Montgomery and another 
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24,000 tons they had brought in from other areas. It was later estimated the facility would 
have needed 150,000 tons to be profitable (Yawn, 2018). That is an interesting figure, but 
no articles could back up that profitability target claim. 
Table 3: IREP Statement of Operations (IREP, 2014) 
 I created a recovery estimate shown in table 4 based on the graduated scale I 
obtained from Crabb, assuming the 18,210 tons of compost was for the entire 18-month 
life span, the $1.9 million was for the 8.5 months from April-December 2014, and the 
78,000 plus 24,000 tons was for the 12 months of November-October 2015. For revenue 
per ton, let’s assume that the $1.9 million in 8.5 months was based on 55,250 tons 
(78000/12*8.5). I will also assume that since in the final 12 months that they got 78,000 
from the city that the first 12 months was probably less since they would have 
complained, I will use 70,000 as my low estimate and the best-case scenario would be the 
same as the last 12 months 102,000. So, for the full first year where they had $2.5 million 
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in dumping fees I will assume they made about $2.4 million (1.9/55250*70000) from 
selling recyclables. This means that the amount of material sold was only 4.9-30.3 
percent based on these assumptions and the graduated scale. However, it also means that 
they made $77-700 per ton for what was sold. These are huge ranges, but what it does tell 
us is that even though the recovery was only 30 percent at best, they were succeeding in 
making a good amount per ton, $77, at worst. This could also mean that they were 
achieving 60 percent recovery but could only sell half of these commodities due to the 
contamination. This lends more validity to the contamination problem. 
 
Table 4: My IREP Estimations 
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 The bankruptcy at IREP isn’t a gravestone for economically feasible MWPF. 
However, it did illustrate a handful of things. First, at best, only 30 percent of the total 
waste steam was recovered clean enough to sell in the form of fiber, plastic, and metal 
with compost adding another 12 percent. That is even for a city with no single stream 
recycling in program currently in place which means there was more valuable material 
left in the stream then there would be in Columbus and absolute best-case scenario, even 
counting the unsold and non-composted organics, it still only matched the 42 percent 
Columbus achieves without any more investment. This means that current technology 
isn’t good enough to allow for a standalone MWPF to achieve the 70+ percent recovery 
wanted. Second it showed that if you want to have a standalone MWPF you must be very 
realistic with your estimates and there will need to be a lucrative deal with a municipality 
for a loan or tax/subsidy to make it possible. Finally, it is now much harder for 
Montgomery to switch to the idea of a single stream participation driven program. Which 
illustrates that this could erode the consumer consumption habits creating a worsening 
over time which may mean that even when the technology is there we may not want to 
utilize it. Interesting to note is that the shuttered facility has just been purchased with 
plans to start back up, if they will be successful and what there focuses will be are still 
yet to be seen (Staub, 2018, RePower). Now, it is important to further analyze this issue 
of contamination.
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Chapter 5. Opposition to Mixed Waste Processing Facilities 
The MWPF has been heralded by many as the idealistic image of what could 
make waste management simple and streamlined, but adoption rates have been low over 
the past couple of decades for several reasons. From the first Dirty MRFs of the 1990’s to 
the most recent failed attempt by IREP-Montgomery in 2014, there have been too many 
barriers to overcome. The main concern surrounding MWPFs, as mentioned in the last 
chapter, is contamination, that is, the quality of recovered materials may be inferior to 
that of the single stream system. 
The concern surrounding contamination has drawn a ton of opposition. Some of 
the opponents include the National Recycling Coalition and RIC members. The Paper 
Recycling Coalition gave a presentation back in 2015 on their opinion on the matter. One 
of their arguments is that since they create food packaging the contaminates that are 
present in MWPF do not allow for sanitary end products (McPoland, 2015). They see 
these three things as threats to the fiber supply: Waste paper/board from hospitals 
contaminated with bio- hazardous material; recovered paper/board which has been mixed 
with garbage destined for landfills and subsequently sorted out (rather than sourced from 
single and dual recycling streams), and secondary fiber from households containing used 
hygienic paper (kitchen towels, handkerchiefs, facial tissue, toilet paper and diapers) 
(McPoland, 2015). All these concerns limit the adoption of MWPFs. 
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The Paper Recycling Coalition also provided an exert from a contract with an 
actual MWPF,  
XXXXX commodities are secondary post-consumer materials, recovered 
manually from municipal solid waste, and will not be technically perfect or 
completely free of contamination. It is the sole responsibility of the Purchaser to 
determine the suitability of XXXXX materials for his purposes. XXXXX will 
accept no responsibility for materials sold by XXXXX as a certain grade and then 
resold by Purchaser as a higher grade, or for materials marketed by Purchaser to 
third parties or end users that have zero tolerance for items commonly found in 
municipal solid waste. In all such cases, Purchaser assumes sole responsibility for 
all costs associated with rejections, downgrades, sorting, disposal, and/or claims 
of any kind (Mcpoland, 2015, p. 13). 
 
This was to illustrate the fact that the product was not clean and that they were shifting 
responsibility to the purchaser. This doesn’t seem like a valid argument for why it 
shouldn’t be allowed. What it shows is that those recovering the waste are being 
straightforward and honest. These outputs may need to be cleaned more to be suitable for 
food products, sold to companies that aren’t worried about that issue, or potentially 
cooked to kill contaminates and to be fit for compost without the concern for seepage. 
 The big players that are opposing this make it clear that contamination needs to be 
dealt with. More buyers from these systems and operators of the systems need to come 
forward with testimonials and data to alleviate these concerns. However, some operators 
have already attested to these issues in the past as consulting firm Gershman, Brickner & 
Bratton, Inc (GBB) states, 
The facilities at Newby Island, Greenwaste, and Montgomery have been selling 
their recovered recyclables, including fiber, and it was indicated by Infinitus that 
the price was “hi-side,” especially for containers and metal. On the other hand, the 
Medina County MWPF has recently been idled and come under scrutiny because 
of the county’s low recycling rate. However, the fiber, plastics and metals 
recovered from the Medina County MWPF have been able to be marketed by 
their facility operator over the past 20 years. It is an older facility but the operator 
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and paper market both indicated to GBB that the fiber recovered from their 
manual sort lines had always been marketable. It is important to understand that 
the Medina system is old and has none of the design features or unique specialty 
equipment that is being installed in modern MRFs and MWPFs (Gershman, 2015, 
p. 39). 
 
Infinitus is IREP and this statement from them is only true because they only sold the 
cleanest of what was pulled out, proved by the breakdown of their revenue in the 
previous chapter. It should also be assumed that Medina is only selling the best of the 
best which would explain the ability to stay afloat financially with such low recovery 
rates. The current scales seem to show strong opposition outweighing little hard proof 
from the supporters. 
Another thing to keep in mind when looking at MWPFs is the consumer 
participation. The fact that none is required is both a blessing and a curse. It allows for an 
immediate rise to 100 percent “participation”, but it also means that there is no education 
and a potential worsening in consumption habits (Peacock). This worsening has been 
seen in other technologies, for example, when airbags were first introduced there were 
more accidents and injuries because people felt safer and drove more recklessly. This can 
also be seen in the bystander effect and the Milgram shock experiments which both 
showed how people act less carefully when they think it is someone else’s problem. 
These are just examples and assumptions because tests that would allow some degree of 
certainty of consumers reactions and habit changes would take a lot of surveying and be a 
whole other research thesis.  
The opposition to MWPFs is also strengthened by the lack of success in Houston,  
a city of 2.2 million with just a 6-percent recycling rate, even a $1 million grant 
and $50,000 of in-kind support from Bloomberg Philanthropies Mayors Challenge 
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has not been able to get its “One Bin For All” project off the ground—at least, not 
yet (Quinn, 2016, p. 36).  
 
This shows that not only does it look unlikely for the technology to be good enough, but 
even when it is it may be better to avoid it. 
 Not only are MWPFs struggling with this issue, but even the biggest single stream 
recycling companies are struggling. CNBC reported that from 2014 to 2016 Waste 
Management has closed 21% of its recycling facilities (totaling 30 facilities), with no 
intentions to open any new ones—however a few more may close in the near future 
(Musulin, 2016). The MRF closures are a result of the overall recycling industry 
struggling to stay profitable. Waste Management's Newark Area Vice President Tara 
Hemmer told CNBC that a bale of aluminum cans that used to sell for more than $2,000 
per ton now sells for $1,100 per ton. Due to low oil prices, it is simply more cost-
effective for manufacturers to make virgin materials like plastic than to purchase recycled 
materials (Musulin, 2016). Another big reason for this problem is how cheap it is to 
landfill material in flat states like Ohio where tipping fees are around $40 versus other 
regions where it can be in the $70 range. Additionally, California has large subsidies, for 
example, in Ohio Rumpke may sell a ton of aluminum to Anheuser-Busch for $1400, but 
in California the government adds on $2000 to that in California Redemption Value 
(CRV). If facilities with all recyclables are struggling, then it seems logical that a MWPF 
that had to dig through more waste to get to it couldn’t stay profitable.
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Chapter 6. Review of End Products 
 It is important to examine each end product in detail because with a changing 
political landscape surrounding single use materials and China regulations, profitability 
of waste management will no longer be as achievable as in the past. Some estimates say 
that about 20 percent of current waste is believed to be impossible to recover such as 
diapers, painted Christmas trees, and skateboard wheels, and another 10 percent has no 
current recovery system (ex. toothpaste tubes, sandwich bags, lip balm tubes, drink 
pouches, etc.) (Timpane). The 70 percent that is currently readily recoverable and/or 
compostable will largely drive the overall revenue from recovering waste. Table 5 gives a 
summary of some of the important factors of these potential end products that will be 
discussed in detail in the next subsections. 
Material Cleanable Environmental/ 
Energy Saved 
Market Demand Cost to 
recover 
Portion 
of total 
stream 
Plastic Potential High High, unpredictable High 16% 
Metal Potential High High, unpredictable Low 4% 
Fiber 
(paper) 
No Medium High, unpredictable High 28% 
RDF/Ma
ss Burn 
n/a Low Low, predictable Low 100% 
Organics n/a High High, predictable Low 52% 
Table 5: Summary of End Products 
 The Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries (ISRI) releases a Scrap Specifications 
Circular at least once per year, but as often as quarterly, that outline standards for 
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businesses in the recovery and recycling realm to look to for expected qualities of 
material. The guidelines presented in Appendix A are based on the April 16, 2018 update, 
but these guidelines are just benchmarks and industry standards. The guidelines that truly 
matter are that of the company you are trying to sell to, some may be more lenient than 
the standard and others may be stricter. Each one of these end products is affected by the 
organic portion of the waste stream that get the other materials wet and dirty. This is also 
where the new, more stringent, requirements in China are causing problems. 
 
Plastics, Metals, and Fibers 
 To better understand the issues that arise with the contamination in MWPFs it is 
important to read the excerpts from the Scrap Specifications Circular in Appendix A that 
describe what are considered standard expectations. It is clear to see that a MWPF that 
allows for recyclables to be in a dumpster with wet organic matter and other contaminates 
would make these standards extremely difficult to meet, maybe even impossible for 
fibers. 
 The market for metals is the strongest because it is more valuable compared to 
paper or plastics, it is more cost effective to recover, and it is easier to process back into 
raw material. Plastics can usually only be recycled 1-2 times, fiber 5-7 times, and metals 
and glasses pretty much infinite (Sinai, 2017). Another important detail is the energy 
saved versus making it out of virgin materials, aluminum is the most efficient source and 
saves about 95 percent of the energy, while glass is the least efficient and still saves 30 
percent. Plastic and metal waste sent through a MWPF would require a pre-wash system 
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to meet standards or need to be sold at a steep discount compared to single stream 
facilities if recyclers decided to buy them and clean them themselves. Another point is 
the unnecessariness of single use plastics that are filling up our landfills and oceans and 
killing sea life; all while more sustainable fiber and metal alternatives are available.  
As stated, fibers are the big bottleneck when it comes to MWPFs. The 
contamination effects them much worse than plastics and metals because those can be 
cleaned better and what is left can be burned off because they are recycled at high 
temperatures. Paper is pulped and the oil and other contaminates float to the top with the 
paper leaving holes in the parchment when dried and there are currently no techniques to 
remove the oil efficiently. Fran McPoland of the Paper Recycling Coalition said, "This is 
pretty much alchemy. It's just an impossible situation to say you can logically 
contaminate this material and by some magic process separate it back (Yawn, 2015, p. 
25).” However, a mill could potentially send the paper back through the process, but then 
they would have to pay less because they have double the operating costs as a regular 
mill. However, if other end product uses for this spotted paper can be found that doesn’t 
require it to be quite as sturdy or attractive then it wouldn’t matter, and it would be 
cheaper for the customer to buy than the higher quality alternative. These fibers could 
also just be composted with the food, yard, and wood waste to help get the 
carbon/nitrogen ratio right. 
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Waste to Energy: Refuse-Derived Fuel and Mass Burn 
 Waste-to-energy technologies have become abundant and commonly used in trash 
disposal. Sweden has even bragged that it does such a good job of handling trash that it 
imports it from neighboring countries. However, is the act of turning trash to energy 
environmentally friendly? Most of the numbers say no, according to the US EPA, 
burning waste has a larger average nitrogen and sulfur oxide emission level than natural 
gas, but less than coal (Leblanc, 2018). However, it is much worse than renewable 
energies like solar and wind, and it takes away non-renewable resources that could have 
been recycled for reuse. For these reasons it is currently not ideal to include a mass burn 
or RDF system at a future Columbus facility at this point. It isn’t the best-case scenario 
and using it would put off finding a better solution. To add more validity to this claim just 
look to the city of Houston. 
 Back in 2014 the city of Houston, Texas was taking proposals for landfill 
diversion strategies. The Zero Waste Houston Coalition created a study to show why a 
proposal for a dirty MRF with an incineration component was not the best choice. The 
main conclusions from the report read as follows,  
For every ton of household garbage, there are as many as 71 tons of materials 
discarded upstream during the extraction, refining, manufacturing and distribution 
of those materials. Incineration does nothing to change the upstream production of 
waste, which accounts for a larger quantity of greenhouse gas emissions than 
landfilling. To rely on waste burning without addressing waste reduction is ill-
advised, and Denmark missed their climate change goals because of their reliance 
on phased incineration (Zero Waste Houston, 2014, N/A). 
 
It is difficult to argue with those facts against both RDF and Mass Burn technologies, but 
AD with organics may be a different, more sustainable, story. 
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Organics and Anaerobic Digestion 
 The organic fraction of the municipal waste stream in Columbus is very important 
for recycling rates because it makes up the biggest portion of the stream. The main forms 
that organic waste comes in are food, wood, yard, and fiber. There are a couple 
mainstream solutions to dealing with the organic waste. One being to use it for daily 
cover for the landfill since soil or another cover will need to be used anyway, another 
option is to create compost/soil amendment out of it for growing food or improving soil 
structure, and finally you can create energy out of it through anaerobic digestion which 
can also be done while creating compost/soil amendment. It is promising that there are so 
many output options, but for an organic focus to be sustainable it is important to look at 
the potential of each. 
Anaerobic digestion is used for organics, while the other wastes like plastic are 
burned. This is because of the high moisture content, “AD is a controlled process that 
allows microbes to break down organics in an environment devoid of oxygen. The 
process produces a biogas that can be used for electricity production or processed into 
compressed natural gas (CNG) (Gershman, 2015, p. 10).” When it comes to AD there are 
a multitude of different systems available to use.  
A possible AD contender for use in Columbus was Zero Waste Energy 
Development Company (ZWEDC) which operates the largest anaerobic digestion facility 
in the world. However, it is not economically effective without a large subsidy like the 
one they receive from the state of California. ZWEDC’s facility can handle up to 90,000 
26 
 
tons of organics per year, creating 6,778 MWh of electricity and 30,000 tons of finished 
compost (Zero Waste Energy). The compost that comes out of the system is not finished 
and ready for sale, it must be sent to a sister facility to mature in an AG-bag for another 3 
months or so. The cost of building the facility was $55 million and they are depreciating 
that amount over 15-20 years, this expense is included in their operating expense of $13 
million per year. They are currently reporting a $500,000 deficit every month and the 
facility currently has 23 full time employees. Working under the assumptions that they 
are selling electricity for about $.155 per kilo-watt hour and compost for a hefty, and 
unlikely, $50 per ton, and their operating expenses include everything, they are getting a 
subsidy of almost $4.5 million dollars per year on just 90,000 tons of organic waste. This 
is not something Columbus should look to imitate. 
A potential composting contender was Sevier Solid Waste, Inc. (SSWI) Compost 
Plant, they are the largest municipal solid waste compost facility in the U.S. They use in-
vessel digesters and claim that after 28 days they have Grade A compost. They process 
approximately 375 tons per day with 60 percent of that composted to create over 70,000 
tons of compost for local farms, erosion control, and many other uses listed on their 
websites compost page including: starting new lawns, top dressing, mulching, flower 
beds, tree planting, and topsoil enrichment (Sevier). The other 40 percent is screened off 
and taken to an onsite MRF. They have a prototype of a cleaning system that removes 
compost from the metal before it is baled and from the plastics before sale, but it is not 
yet meeting their buyer’s specifications. However, this organic focus allows them to 
successfully divert 70 percent of their waste stream, so it must have some validity to it 
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(Sevier). An advantage they have is being a tourist heavy area, so their waste stream has a 
much different composition than that of a city like Columbus, but since Columbus has a 
successful single stream system in place there is an opportunity for this style of system to 
be successful and AD can always be added. 
When it comes to maturing the compost, there is a company called, Green 
Mountain Technologies (GMT), that has two large-scale systems that can process about 
300 TPD or about 110,000 tons per year. The one option is an Aerated Static Pile system 
that would cost $1,500,000 and the second is a Turned Aerated Pile that would cost 
$2,000,000 plus $500,000 for equipment. The Static system would require three operators 
and the Turned system would require two operators and cover 6 acres. The estimated 
lifespan is 20 years for pads and 10 for turners and blowers. The turned system would be 
optimal even though it has more upfront costs because it requires less works, less space, 
and matures the compost more quickly. 
There are different grades of compost that come with different uses and price tags, 
but there is also a ton of variance just within Grade A. Branded, Grade A, bagged organic 
compost such as EcoScraps is $6.47 for a one cubic foot bag (23 pounds) which would be 
$562 a ton vs. SSWI giving theirs away for free. A typical price range for bulk compost 
ranges from $10-$40 a ton. How high quality of mix we could make from this, and how 
we decided to market/position it, would have a huge effect on price.  
Finally, since it seems as if a facility like SSWI with GMT pads would show great 
promise it is important to keep in mind a utilization plan. Plastics and metals are sold 
much differently than composts and we would create hundreds of thousands of tons of it.  
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Even though there are multiple end uses none have the scale that farmland does. If test 
plots could be created that prove this compost improves crop yields, then there would be 
an immediate end use for this massive amount of material and little risk to the facility.
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Chapter 7. Cost to Columbus 
 There are two options available to supplement Columbus’s single stream efforts, a 
MWPF that focuses on a last resort sort of plastics and metals and one that focuses on 
organics. The important thing is which one has the best tradeoff between benefits (landfill 
value and resale value) and costs (the price to construct and run). SWACO landfills 
around one million tons of waste a year which would take a facility that could process 
200 tons per hour running 20 hours a day, 250 days per year. The size of the cost with 
adding waste processing facilities is large, and the total amount that can be diverted is 
difficult to estimate, making it a risky project. To be more realistic I propose we assume 
that this would be a three-phase plan with the first phase being around 300,000 tons, or 
almost one-third of the waste stream, and what I will use in my calculations. 
 
Mixed Waste Processing Facility Focused on Plastics and Metals 
 The most important things regarding the financials of this plan are the cost of the 
facility, the expected labor expense, the expected recovery rates and market values, and 
the expected energy cost. These numbers will allow me to estimate the profitability, or 
lack thereof, and the loan required to construct the facility. I contacted the five largest 
MRF manufacturers in the U.S. to estimate the cost of the facility. Some responded and 
provided cost estimates for me. I used a different approach for those that did not respond, 
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I used data from their past projects to estimate the costs. The summary of the costs are 
seen in Table 6. 
(Millions) Machinex Stadler CP Group VDRS BHS 
Equipment $18 $45 $10 $25 $35 
Site & 
Building 
$15 $20 $15 $15 $15 
Total $33 $65 $25 $40 $50 
Claimed 
Recovery 
90% of 
recoverable 
About 15-
20% 
90% of 
recoverable 
About 15-
20% 
15-20% of stream if 
stand alone 
So more likely 7.5-
10% 
90% of 
recoverable 
About 15-
20% 
90% of 
recoverable 
About 15-
20% 
Comp. Company 
Estimate 
Company 
Estimate 
Sun Valley 2-50 TPH 
$11 when built, $15 
today, focused on 
RDF and BTU value, 
maybe 20% recovery 
Current 56 
TPH single 
stream 
facility 
Athens 
Services 
70TPH-$50 
(Partial) 
IREP 30 
TPH- $32 
Table 6: MWPF Prices 
These numbers show a large divide in the expected cost for such a facility, but also allow 
very different recovery expectations. I will be using $40 million for this comparison 
because this is close to the estimates from VDRS and Machinex. I chose this because 
they are neither the lowest nor the highest across the group and is close to the average 
across all five. 
 To estimate the employee count I reached out to manufacturers of the facilities, 
management of currently operational single stream and mixed waste facilities and, 
utilized IREPs numbers. I converted these numbers up to my 300,000 tons needed and 
used them to estimate my expected employee count. Table 7 lays out the information I 
gathered after conducting the interviews. 
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Table 7: Labor Estimations for 300,000 Tons Per Year (TPY) 
The biggest wildcard in this is the number of sorters and general labor required. As you 
can see across the board there is a big difference there, the difference is caused by two 
things: first, the level of automation of the equipment and second, the hopeful recovery 
rates. For example, Stadler has a highly automated and more expensive system that needs 
30 sorters, but the less automated version needs 120 which would make operating 
expenses much higher. The Vanderlinde and Green Waste are so low because they aren’t 
trying to achieve as high of a recovery rate because they also utilize mass burn that is 
environmentally harmful.  
After this I estimated expected administrative roles of sales, accounting, and 
human resources. The next step was to find out competitive salaries for these positions 
and then to figure out how much benefits would add to compute an expected yearly 
salary expense. For my estimations in table 8 I assumed we would have a more 
automated system with two or three robots performing quality control.  
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Table 8: Plastic and Metal Focused Labor Expectations 
 Table 8 outlays the labor breakdown expected at a high-tech facility including 
salary, commission, and benefits with a total labor expense around $6.6 million. 
However, some manufactures did claim to be much less than some of these numbers, but 
to reiterate, IREPs biggest problem was not being safe with estimates so I will be 
excluding the outliers. 
 Recovery rates were another thing that IREP overshot on. I looked at the opinion 
of two of the top consulting firms in the field and combined that with one machine 
manufacturer that gave me a breakdown of all their safe estimates. I decided what I felt 
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was a safe estimate given the information in table 9 from Machinex, RRS, and GBB and 
came out with the rates you will see in the percentage reclaimed column of table 10. 
Table 9: Recovery Estimations (Gershman, 2015) 
The below table will estimate the expected revenue to be generated by the facility from 
the sale of recovered materials. Material prices were estimated based on historical prices 
obtained from the former Executive Director of SWACO, Mike Long. Depending on the 
material and how long it had been being tracked there was 2-12 years of monthly prices 
that were used to create safe expected estimates for the expected average value over the 
next decade an example of the work can be seen in Appendix C. 
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Table 10: Plastic and Metal Focused Expected Revenue 
 As far as energy use goes my friends at Rumpke helped me estimate what to 
expect. Brad Dunn, the Recycling Operations Manager for their Cincinnati MRF said that 
their average monthly electrical service expense for the plant is about $34,000. That is on 
a 56 TPH line that is processing about 16,500 tons per month making the cost about 
$2.06 per ton. However, he also said it was important to remember that these costs are 
also for supporting factors like lighting and safety equipment. So, at $2.06 per ton a 
300,00-ton facility would be about $618,000 per year. 
 
Mixed Waste Processing Facility Focused on Organics 
 As shown below in table 11 the labor will be much less intensive then on the 
IREP style MWPF. 
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Table 11: Organic Focused Labor Expense  
As far as cost of the facility goes SSWI just bought two new digestors from Citic 
Holdings in China. They were priced at $3 million for construction, $2 million for 
installation and teaching, and $750,000 for transportation from Shanghai to Tennessee. 
These are each capable of 90 tons per day and need to have off days for maintenance. To 
get to 300,000 tons using the same 250 days as the facility focused on plastics and fibers 
would take about 14 digestors. If two were a combined $5.75 million then we can assume 
some order quantity discounts would ensue, so I will use $35 million as a benchmark. 
This system will also require a place for compost to age which I will use GMTs 
technology for which can process about 300 TPD and cost $2,000,000 plus $500,000 for 
equipment. Since we will need the equivalent to 1.5 of these we will assume around $4 
million. Plus, buildings, offices, and sifting equipment bringing the total to about $11 
million with a grand total of $50 million.  
 My friends at SSWI helped for the energy estimate. They are spending about 
$35,000 a month on electricity between: lights, digestors (3 at $15,000), primary screen, 
conveyer belts, final screen, and baler. They have 3 digestors at $5,000 each so for 14 it 
should be estimated at $70,000 and the $20,000 in others is capable for more space then 
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that since some of their digestors are currently off line so $20,000 times 3.5 quantity 
would be about $70,000 so a total of $140,000 a month. That is $1,680,000 per year. 
 
Comparison 
 So, table 12 is what a comparison of the two facilities would look like with the 
expected yearly facility cost calculated in Appendix B.  
 
Table 12: Final Comparison  
However, it is also important to point out the main assumptions I made to make this 
accurate, as well as, what would have to happen to get organics to profitability or to have 
plastic and metal become the better choice. To make this accurate the assumptions that 
would have to hold true are that electricity, fuel, and metal prices along with labor 
required, labor expense, and interest rates would all need to hold relatively stable over the 
next year. For Organics to get to profitability we would need to see the cost of digestors 
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come down, the efficiency of energy use to improve, or be able to sell compost, (instead 
of giving it away for free) metal, plastics, or energy from AD. For plastic and metal to 
become more profitable than the organic focus, sorting and cleaning technologies would 
have to get immensely more efficient, cheaper, and better which may be feasible with 
advancements in artificial intelligence and robotic automation. However, that is not even 
considering the potential effect to consumption habits making it undesirable.  
 To supplement the financials there are also other factors that make an organic 
focus a better choice. As mentioned we do not want to erode the current single stream 
participation rate because it is still better for the environment and an organic focus 
wouldn’t let consumers believe we recycle for them. Plus, recyclables in a MWPF are 
already dirty at the beginning so if we can invent a cleaning system we might as well 
utilize it when they are even dirtier post organic.  
 Additionally, Columbus is the perfect testing ground for multiple reasons. There 
is already a single stream system in place allowing for organics to be the focus. There are 
two knowledgeable resources in The Ohio State University and Rumpke. There are 
economies of scale due to all the waste already going to SWACO. There is an immediate 
need for improvement because Columbus’s projected growth will lead to more waste. 
And finally, SWACO is actively interested, as noted by what their director of innovation 
said to me when I mentioned this research and my idea to create test plots at the landfill 
to measure potential yield increases, “...we agree that organics is an issue and 
opportunity. The project could be a benefit to SWACO in expanding our knowledge and 
we would like to pursue discussions with you to assist with this research.”  So, not only 
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does this system have potential to extend the landfill life, but Columbus is the perfect 
location and it would be easy to do a proof of concept.
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
 We are experiencing a plateau in participation rates for recycling. Mass burning 
material for energy is worse for the environment than landfilling. MWPFs that try to take 
people completely out of the equation and theoretically raise “participation rates” to 100 
percent do not currently have the technology to make them a viable option, due to 
contamination. Getting paper wet and dirty causes a huge problem in recycling it and 
plastic and metal have a similar, but less serious problem. So, as of now it seems like a 
single stream component will always be necessary. Some people tout mixed waste 
processing at the idealistic view of the future, but I believe the effect that will have on our 
consumption habits will be horrible as shown by examples in other technology and 
cognitive behavior tests. This was also help us keep a focus on lessening single use 
plastics for more sustainable fiber and metal alternatives. 
 Having one facility for the single stream efforts and one for the garbage, focused 
on organics, seems to be the right answer now and may always be the right answer. 
Technology will allow us to save more from this stream in the future like cleaning 
plastics and metals on the back end of the organic system.  
 The only thing that could trump this is what California is doing. Residents there 
must separate their waste into three bins: recycling, organics, and trash, plus there are 
large subsidies for recyclables. This would be ideal but is a long way off from legislation 
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to require/allow that in Ohio. A facility like SSWI in Columbus would still be able to 
easily transition to that framework in the future with no loss to the city. This is due to 
using a phased approach, after seeing the failure of Team Gemini, that will would allow 
for there to be no machine idle time if we switched to a 3-bin approach because I would 
only build the facility up to 500,000-600,000 tons which is currently the portion of the 
stream that is organic. It is vital to keep these kinds of political and extraneous factors in 
mind because of the 20 plus year life span of these types of investments. What must be 
done moving forward is finding out what it would take to create a viable compost from 
the Columbus waste stream to use it on the farmland in the county. 
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Appendix A: Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries Specifications 
The standard specifications included in this Circular are intended to assist members in the 
buying and selling of their materials and products. These specifications are derived from 
many sectors of the metals, paper stock, plastics, glass, and electronics industries and are 
constructed to represent the quality or composition of the materials bought and sold in the 
industry. The specifications are internationally accepted and are used throughout the 
world to trade the various commodities. Parties to a transaction may specify particular 
variations or additions to these specifications as are suited for their specific transactions 
and for their individual convenience. Any deviation from the standard specifications, 
how- ever, should be mutually agreed to and so stipulated in writing by the par- ties to the 
transactions (Institute, 2018, p. 2). 
 
Plastics - Unspecified materials must not exceed 2% of total bale weight. The bale should 
be free of any free-flowing liquid of any type. Shipments should be essentially free of 
dirt, mud, stones, grease, glass, and paper. The plastic must not have been damaged by 
ultraviolet exposure. Every effort should be made to store the material above ground and 
under cover. A good faith effort on the part of the supplier will be made to include only 
rinsed bottles which have closures removed (p. 33-42). 
 
Ferrous Metal Scrap - Cleanness. All grades shall be free of dirt, nonferrous metals, or 
foreign material of any kind, and excessive rust and corrosion. However, the terms “free 
of dirt, nonferrous metals, or foreign material of any kind” are not intended to preclude 
the accidental inclusion of negligible amounts where it can be shown that this amount is 
unavoidable in the customary preparation and handling of the particular grade involved. 
Off-grade material. The inclusion in a shipment of a particular grade of iron and steel 
scrap of a negligible amount of metallic material which exceeds to a minor extent the 
applicable size limitations, or which fails to a minor extent to meet the applicable 
requirements as to quality or kind of material, shall not change the classification of the 
shipment, provided it can be shown that the inclusion of such off-grade material is 
unavoidable in the customary preparation and handling of the grade involved (p. 13-22). 
 
Fiber- All paper must be packed dry with a moisture content of 12%which is deemed to 
be the maximum dry limit. Prior to shipment the buyer and seller shall agree to a 
moisture percentage and a method by which moisture is to be tested. The grading section 
defines the waste we would have as, 3. Zero Tolerance The term “Zero Tolerance” as 
used throughout this section is defined as: Any material that contains any amount of 
Medical, Organic, Food Waste, Hazardous, Poisonous, Radioactive or Toxic waste and 
other harmful substances or liquids (p. 26-32). 
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Appendix B. Loan Calculations 
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Appendix C. Example of Historical Prices 
 
 
 
 
